A discourse analysis of “social construction” in communication scholarship by Jessica Robles (1384884)
Running Head: A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Discourse Analysis of “Social Construction” in Communication Scholarship 
  
Abstract 
How has the phrase “social construction” been used among communication scholars over the 
past 45 years? This paper characterizes some of the ways in which “social construction” as an 
idea has been taken up in communication scholarship. In particular, the paper considers what is 
useful and what is problematic in the different ways social construction is used. First, this paper 
presents trends in usage, particularly from the early 1990s onward, in several top communication 
journals. Second, ways of using the concept are analyzed in published articles. Third, discourse 
about social construction and uses of the phrase are examined in three state-of-the art fora in 
light of the tensions and questions of doing social construction research. Finally, practical 
implications for the continuing usefulness of the term are considered.  
Key words: social construction, discourse analysis, grounded practical theory, communication 
research
 
 
  
A Discourse Analysis of Social Construction 1 
 
A Discourse Analysis of “Social Construction” in Communication Scholarship 
Disciplines are social constructions. They are things that we have made up. They 
are not terribly old. And like with other social constructions, once we made them 
up we forgot that we invented them and we think that disciplines actually exist in 
some fashion. (Leeds-Hurwitz, 2009a) 
 Since Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) The Social Construction of Reality, the idea of 
“social construction” has gone back and forth between being utterly radical, and utterly taken for 
granted. In the social approaches to communication research which emerged during the 1980s-
1990s (e.g. Pearce & Cronen, 1980; Sigman, 1987; Leeds-Hurwitz 1992, 1995), social 
construction developed as a component of interpretivist, qualitative research. As many social 
approaches in communication research evolved into what is today referred to as Language and 
Social Interaction, social construction has not everywhere been an explicit focus (there are 
exceptions, e.g., Buttny, 1993). Though LSI scholars routinely make mention of jointly-
constructed interaction in which social construction is implicated, it is noteworthy that the 
Communication as Social Construction division was created in 2007 as a new interest group in 
the National Communication Association. This makes relevant the question of whether the use of 
and continued conversations about social construction as a concept are worthwhile to 
communication research.  
As Leeds-Hurwitz (2009a) states in the quotation above (and elsewhere: Galanes & 
Leeds-Hurwitz, 2009; Leeds-Hurwitz, 2010), disciplines are socially constructed. In using 
particular language and treating certain ideas as central, members of an intellectual community 
shape and re-shape the critical meanings of a discipline, indeed formulating its reality through 
communication practices. Does the concept of social construction continue to have a practical 
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role in constructing communication scholarship? This paper investigates how the term “social 
construction” has been used in the communication field, what is interesting or problematic about 
its uses, and what implications this has for the life of the idea of social construction.  
The purpose of this inquiry is to take seriously the idea that language use is consequential 
to communities and that participants’ terminological choices matter in the everyday construction 
of meaning. Studying how the use of a term has been used can reveal what about the term is 
valuable and worth maintaining as well as what problems emerge in its use—and whether such 
problems indicate that social construction is a lively idea worthy of continued exploration, or 
whether it is becoming meaningless.  
This paper begins by discussing trends in usage of the idea of “social construction,” 
particularly from the early 1990s onward, in several of the top communication journals. 
Representative ways of using the phrase and its associated terms (social constructs, social 
constructionism) are illustrated in four randomly-selected publications to provide a closer, 
qualitative complement to such trends of usage. The paper then presents an analysis of discourse 
about social construction and uses of the phrase in three state-of-the art fora (Shotter and 
Gergen’s 1994 Communication Yearbook contribution, Bartesaghi and Castor’s 2008 
Communication Yearbook contribution, and NCA’s 2009 Communication as Social Construction 
Division’s Five Years Out conference panel).  
The reviews presented herein are not meant to be exhaustive, and due to their breadth 
cannot engage in deep analysis; rather, this paper offers a broad view of the terrain of uses of 
social construction to offer considerations which may then be investigated in more detailed ways 
in future work. These reviews and analyses reveal uses of social construction that draw attention 
to worthwhile perspectives which place communication at the heart of human life. Also revealed 
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is a tension in which “social construction” is sometimes used in service of different (even 
contradictory) persuasive aims. Though social construction is flexible in its use and what its use 
may reference, that same flexibility can cause problems if it seems to apply to everything or if it 
obscures important premises.  
The next section sketches a brief overview of what “social construction” has meant, at 
least in its 1966 origins, and how it is commonly defined in communication research today. 
Then, an overview of trends in usage of the phrase across several highly-ranked communication 
journals is discussed. In a discourse analysis of how “social construction” is used in four articles 
from among these journals, I highlight differences indicated by general usage trends. The 
following section focuses on more “self-conscious” uses of “social construction” in three key 
contexts. The paper ends with implications for future practice in using the term “social 
construction” in communication research.  
A Brief History of the Idea of Social Construction 
 Histories too are social constructions, and the brief overview I provide here is one of 
potentially several ways of telling the story. In general, the idea and the phrase “social 
construction” are attributed to  The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge (1966). In this book Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, sociologists, outline a 
framework for seeing knowledge and reality as socially constituted: over time, the typification 
and habituation of certain language practices becomes institutionalized, decontextualized, and 
thenceforward accepted as a sort of “reality” divorced from constructed origins. Other 
intellectual contributions to the idea of social construction include Mead’s views on the 
relationship between self and interaction as the basis of social meaning (1934), Schutz’s (e.g., 
1967) phenomenological approach to social reality (a significant influence on Berger and 
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Luckmann), and Foucault’s analysis of discourse as constitutive of institutions and relationships 
of power (e.g., 1973, 1977).  
Since Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) text, attention to social construction and its 
relationship to ideas of “reality” have featured in numerous intellectual debates among scholars 
in various disciplines about how far down social construction should go. Several of these debates 
took place around scientific practices, for instance in studies in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (e.g., Bloor, 1976; Collins, 1985; Latour, 1987; Pickering, 1984) and the rhetoric of 
science (e.g., Feyerabend, 1975; Gross & Keith, 1997; McCloskey, 1983). Such debates 
prompted further analyses into exactly what sort of “reality” was being “socially constructed.” In 
particular, scholars argued over the extent to which physical or scientific realities could be 
claimed to be socially constructed. 
Based on these arguments, in 1995 Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality proposed 
contra the strong school of “universal constructionism” that social reality—not all reality full 
stop—was what was socially constructed, while Hacking (1999), in agreement, explored the 
same ontological problem in The Social Construction of What? Meanwhile, Edwards, Ashmore 
and Potter (1995) shifted focus to the discourse of arguments against social construction and 
their strategic appeals to reality. This indicates that an ongoing debate over the idea of social 
construction involves the relationship between social construction and different views of reality.  
As Craig (2009) points out, interpretivism as a metatheoretical paradigm sees the social 
world as ontologically different from other realities. Perhaps for this reason, arguments over 
what sort of reality is being constructed have not been as heatedly prevalent in communication 
research—which is largely about social phenomena, especially in an area such as LSI. And yet, 
the relationship between social construction and reality is seen differently among various groups 
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of communication scholars. The post-positivist and quantitative/qualitative arguments 
highlighted during the separation between early interpersonal communication research and social 
approaches to communication provide a classic example of how social construction is interpreted 
by some as intellectually untenable (Orr, 1978) or even as a threat to the status of reality (see 
Craig, 1995; Leeds-Hurwitz, 1995; Patomäki & Wight, 2000).  
Among some critical scholars and others, the problem between social construction and 
reality is linked to the relationship between reality and making judgments. The focus on 
discourse and “symbolic” communication potentially ignores the materiality of social life (e.g., 
Cromby & Nightingale, 1999), while the “constructedness” invokes a dangerously unethical 
specter of relativism—that without having some form of reality beyond what is constructed, we 
have no basis to make ethical judgments (e.g. Burr 1995, 2003). Such critiques seem to see 
construction as akin to deceit or some form of “anything goes” (see Miller, 1994; Patomäki & 
Wight, 2000). Scholars of social construction research are quick to counter such assumptions 
(e.g., Gergen, 1997; McNamee, 2002), but as demonstrated in the analyses below, this struggle 
over what social construction means and when it should apply is relevant to and visible in how 
the term gets used. 
“Social Construction” as a Discursive Practice 
 There are many overviews of social construction research in communication, and so I 
won’t be reviewing them here (though see Bartesaghi & Castor, 2008). Instead, I focus on the 
use of the phrase “social construction.” This section gives an overview of the extent to which and 
ways in which “social construction” has been used in written scholarly practices. The sections of 
this analysis (1) chart some of the trends in uses of the term, and (2) focus on examples of how 
social construction was used in particular works. The purpose of this analysis is to identify 
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techniques for using the term and potential problems which are then examined further in the 
analysis thereafter. The first section offers a simple word-search analysis of the phrase across 
several top communication journals and the second analyzes illustrative examples of the context 
of usage in four semi-randomly selected articles. 
Social Construction in Communication Scholarship 
 In this initial analysis I employed a simple all-text word search of eight top-40 ranked 
communication journals through Sage, Taylor & Francis, and Wiley-Blackwell publishers’ web 
searches between 1987 and 20111. The phrase primarily occurred beginning in the early to mid-
1990s and for the most part appeared steadily thereafter with some journals seeing a surge of 
usage from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s. The eight journals selected include four general 
communication journals and four discourse or LSI-focused journals. The table below outlines in 
how many articles the phrase “social construction” appeared in the text.  
Journal Years searched Articles mentioning “Social Construction” 
Journal of Communication 1987-2011 140 
Communication Research 1987-2011 30 
Human Communication 
Research 1987-2011 38 
Communication Theory 1991-2011 100 
Discourse & Society 1990-2011 133 
Research on Language and 
Social Interaction 1987-2011 21 
Discourse & 
Communication 2007-2011 14 
Discourse Studies 1999-2011 51 
 
 It is certainly the case that “social construction” is mentioned somewhere in a text on a 
regular basis. Often there is at least one mention per year. The phrase is sometimes mentioned 
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multiple times in a single article. Interestingly, there is a high quantity of articles in which the 
mention occurs in the references but is not explicitly discussed in the content. This accounts for 
more than half of what appears to be rampant referencing of “social construction” in Journal of 
Communication and Discourse & Society, with a notable exception to this being Communication 
Theory. Such trends are not unduly surprising. As more is written on “social construction,” more 
is referenced. As more is referenced, more is, perhaps, assumed. It becomes not an explicit topic, 
but an underlying basis for the focal research.  
And as Leeds-Hurwitz (2009b) points out, much social construction research uses other 
vocabularies to describe similar impulses. “Social construction” is not the only phrase which 
marks research of as being within a social construction approach. Other terms used alongside 
social construction include “social construct,” “social constructionism,” “social construction 
theory,” “discursive construction,” “language construction,” “interpretive,” “constitutive” and 
sometimes just “construction.” All of these appear to varying extents in the searches above. 
However, for purposes of analysis in the next section, this paper focuses on explicitly using the 
label “social construction” to describe a research perspective, subject of study or communication 
process involved in an analysis.  
 When “social construction” is indeed used productively in the content of the scholarship, 
how is it used? The next section analyzes the usage of the phrase in four articles from two 
different communication journals. The purpose of this closer analysis of discourse is to see what 
variations exist in situated practice. 
Focus on Four Articles 
 In this portion of the analysis, I focus on how “social construction” is used in context to 
look more closely at differences in use. After removing all book reviews and articles in which 
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“social construction” was only mentioned in the references, I narrowed down to the six journals 
in which “social construction” was still mentioned in the most articles (removing Discourse and 
Communication, and Research on Language and Social Interaction). I then selected two journals 
with comparable mention counts in abstracts and years of articles searched, but with different 
foci in the field and different orientations to empirical work and theoretical work: Discourse & 
Society and Communication Theory. For each journal I selected one article from the first and last 
page of the chronologically ordered search results by showing six results per page and rolling a 
die. The results of this are shown in the chart below.  
 
The kind of discourse analysis employed in this paper is influenced by grounded practical theory 
(Craig & Tracy, 1995). In a grounded practical theory approach, an analysis of discourse should 
analyze a practice (here, “use of ‘social construction’ in communication articles”), describe the 
techniques and discursive practices employed, discuss potential problems encountered in the 
production of the practice, and identify standards which shape normative ideals of how the 
practice should be done.  
Journal Year Author(s) Article title 
Co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
Th
eo
ry
 1994 Timothy Stephen 
Communication in the shifting 
context of intimacy: Marriage, 
meaning and modernity 
2011 Laura D. Russell & Austin S. Babrow 
Risk in the making: Narrative, 
problematic integration, and the 
social construction of risk 
D
is
co
ur
se
 &
 
So
ci
et
y 1992 Eleanor M. Novek 
Read it and weep: How metaphor 
limits views of literacy 
2011 Sue Wilkinson 
Constructing ethnicity statistics 
in talk-in-interaction: Producing 
the “white European” 
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 In Novek’s (1992) article, “social construction” is identified with how people talk about 
certain ideas. Novek discusses how public and scholarly metaphors used to talk about literacy 
associate it with personal attributes. The language itself, and its connotation, shape how literacy 
is thought and talked about and constrains engagement with the economic, social and political 
problems involved in literacy. Stephen’s 1994 article makes a theoretical argument for situating 
interpersonal research in its historical context, arguing that the reality of marriage has been 
differently constituted over time in relation to changing social diversity and gender roles.  
 In both earlier articles, “social construction” refers the role of discourse in shaping social 
reality, and the way in which that social reality is shaped differently over time and in different 
contexts. The focus on social reality is perhaps why discussions of ontological or 
epistemological relationships between social construction and reality do not come up. The 2011 
articles emphasize different aspects of social construction, but with overlapping meanings. In 
Russell & Babrow’s article, social construction is cited in association with Berger & Luckmann 
(1966), Gergen (2000) and Luhmann (2002). Russell and Babrow’s (2011) references to social 
construction usually occur in the form “social construction of risk” but comments about social 
constructions and what they are occur throughout the article: 
The progressive understandings of time and agency are not simply inherent in 
narrative or in human experience; rather, they are social constructions we have 
overlearned and hence take to be somehow external to us, truly independent of 
our interpretive processes. (p. 241) 
 In this example, the term “overlearned” is used to indicate that social constructions have 
this quality of having been learned so deeply that one forgets they have been “learned” at all and 
sees them as natural, “external,” “independent of our interpretive processes.” Other references to 
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social construction qualify it in ways that show its meaning-in-use, including “evolving” social 
construction (p. 244) and “act” of social construction (p. 247) to emphasize that social 
construction is an active, creative process which occurs over time. The authors also use the 
phrase “social constructionist perspective” as a frame for discussing the notion of ontological 
uncertainty, and identify recursive social construction as a way in which once a social 
construction is created, it then creates the future reality of what it is to the people who have 
created it. 
 In Wilkinson’s (2011) article, social construction is identified with the creation of “social 
facts” (Townsley, 2007) and is not discussed in detail as an approach. Wilkinson (2011) analyzes 
how social construction practices such as membership categorization construct ethnicity as 
relevant and “real” categories through self-description. Wilkinson also uses the phrase “social 
construction of” (in this case, of ethnicity/race statistics) (p. 344). It is the only mention where 
“social construction” occurs outside of the article’s abstract, key words, and references. 
Nonetheless, it is mentioned in the content of the article and indeed informs much of the article. 
But rather than focusing on the social construction perspective, as Russell and Babrow (2011) do 
in their more theoretically-oriented article, Wilkinson (2011) focuses more on how the 
constructions are achieved: 
The conventions used in statistical data collection, analysis and reporting 
construct particular kinds of representations of the world. The status these 
representations achieve as ‘social facts’ (Townsley, 2007) makes it all the more 
important to understand both their construction and their (intended and 
unintended) uses. In particular, official statistics are instrumental in constructing 
(and reinforcing) the social categories. (p. 344) 
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 In this example, “conventions” and “constructions” are largely interchangeable concepts 
which serve as shorthand for anything which is socially constructed. The reference to “social 
facts” indicates that, as in the other article discussed above, social constructions are not objective 
facts, but social creations. Socially constructed facts offer their own perspectives and ways of 
viewing the world which are then taken as normal or real.  
In the more theoretical papers, there is a stronger emphasis on the idea of social 
construction as a perspective, taking a historical orientation, and gaining insight into some idea: 
“marriage,” “risk.” In the more empirical studies, there is a stronger emphasis on specific 
practices through which social constructions are formed in situated uses of language: 
“metaphor,” “membership categorization.” This points to one major difference in how the term is 
used, in that sometimes it is used as a metatheoretical or theoretical view and sometimes it is 
applied to particular socially constructed items. This does not necessarily line up neatly with 
whether a paper is more theoretical or more empirical. Empirical papers can reference social 
construction in a literature review without the purpose of their paper being to talk about social 
construction (in such cases the term is used as a sort of starting point or background assumption). 
One can imagine that such a practice (a brief, single mention of social construction, perhaps even 
citing Berger & Luckmann (1966), without mentioning the term “social construction” at all) 
could be taken up more often by LSI scholars and discourse analysts if there seemed to be a 
reason for it. This question will be considered at the end of the paper. 
In addition to how the term was used in publications theoretically or empirically, “social 
construction” also indexed multiple different meanings and associations to point out different 
things about particular topics and subjects of the research, including the following: 
Meanings Indexed Through Uses of “Social Construction” 
Language/discourse/communication as that which constitutes the social construction 
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The historical/changing qualities which indicate the constructed nature of social constructions 
Taken-for-granted “realness” or “naturalness” which obscure the constructed nature of social 
constructions 
The effect which social constructions have on material reality and experiences of material reality 
The social, relational or joint nature of construction  
The ways in which social constructions make certain perspectives and actions possible 
The first of this list is perhaps the one which is most apparently useful across wide swathes of 
communication research, regardless of what is studied or what ontological and epistemological 
orientations are claimed. However one defines “communication,” the point that communication 
is what constitutes reality puts communication at the center of human life and thus functions to 
emphasize the importance of communication research. Uses of social construction in 
communication are partly characterized, perhaps unsurprisingly, by discussions of 
communication as the constructing activity. This may be part of what gives the concept capital in 
communication in particular.  
 The other elements in the list, however, differ in importance (and implications with 
“social construction”) across areas of scholarship. They also each differ in their own 
implications. The multiplicity of these meanings and their often-implicit nature can be quite 
valuable. By using the phrase “social construction” to index any one of (or sometimes potentially 
all) of these associated meanings, scholars provide a recognizable symbol which is open to 
interpretation. This flexibility in interpretation makes the term useful, but also may make its 
interpretations broad beyond the point of meaningfulness or could obscure paradoxes in 
unarticulated assumptions.  
 In written scholarship, uses of “social construction” occur with some regularity. 
Sometimes the term is used to investigate an idea. Sometimes the term is used as a reference to a 
starting assumption. Though this was not analyzed, ideas related to the term can also be used 
without mentioning the term at all. These scholarly practices indicate that there is variation in 
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how the term is used and how important using it is assumed to be. Do similar practices in use 
occur in more metadiscursive contexts which are explicitly about social construction? The next 
section focuses on such contexts as well as exploring potential differences in spoken discourse in 
intellectual discussion.  
An Analysis of Three “Social Construction” Events  
When people organize such events which are in some sense “about” the concept to be 
discussed, use of the particular terms and ideas is more self-consciously done, and more explicit 
metadiscourse occurs around the community’s practices related to the concept. For this reason, 
the remainder of this paper briefly discusses discourse about social construction in two 
Communication Yearbook contributions (the latter in 2008 which responds to the former from 
1994) and in particular analyzes more naturally-occurring discourse in a recorded special panel 
on social construction which occurred at the National Communication Association in 2009.  
 As Craig (2006) notes in his discussion of communication as a practice, one indicator of 
the status of a practice is that a metadiscourse is generated about it with regard to how it is or 
should be done and how it could be done better. Though all communication is 
metacommunicative (it communicates both what is being communicated and how to interpret 
what is being communicated) (Bateson, 1972), “metadiscourse” here refers to how the 
communication community talks about (and socially constructs) its own social construction 
(discursive) practices. It is at this level where problems, dilemmas, contradictions and issues in 
the use of “social construction” can arise and become explicit topics of conversation in the field. 
Three fora specially dedicated to discussing social construction in the communication field have 
been selected for further analysis of the use of “social construction” in communication scholarly 
discourse.  
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 The first context is Shotter and Gergen’s 1994 article in Communication Yearbook, in 
which they propose social construction as a framework for communication research. They use 
the metaphor of conversation for their approach, and their characterization of social construction 
is highly interpersonal and relational. Because both scholars are associated with interpersonal 
communication and therapy research, this is not surprising. These interpersonal and relational 
connections to social construction are still a couple of the many associations with the concept, as 
will be shown in the analysis of the third context.  
 The second context is Bartesaghi and Castor’s 2008 response to Shotter and Gergen’s 
(1994) article, in a much later version of Communication Yearbook, in which they revisit the 
proposal, reanalyze social construction as a practical (meta)theory, and contend with critiques of 
social construction. Social construction is offered not as a theory but as a metatheoretical 
approach, and is dissociated from the ontological and epistemological concerns which have 
characterized its emerging use and reconstituted as a practical theoretical orientation. The 
authors work to broaden social construction perspectives beyond U.S. scholarship, but also to 
specify the unique ways in which communication scholars do, and have contributed to, social 
construction research.  
The chapter also looks at social construction in context as a way to address the critique 
against social construction as relativist and nonrealist: Bartesaghi and Castor (2008) use 
examples of ways in which social construction can be applied in order to get at important 
questions of materiality, agency, and consequentiality. Their use of social construction indicates 
a change insofar as social construction can be applied as a framework for improving 
communication practice. Thus it is not just a descriptive or ontological theory about the world, 
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nor a research approach which implicates certain methodologies, but a practical theory with 
implications for application. 
 These two published contexts reviewed social construction in an explicit way. The term 
was explored as a theoretical and metatheoretical concept with empirical and practical 
implications. Though certain ways of treating the term differed—focusing on it as a relational 
concept in the first context, as a practical one in the second—the uses were largely consistent 
with one another (the latter being conspicuously a response to the former) and were not 
inconsistent with the ways in which the term was used across publications in general (as 
discussed in the prior section). The next context, however, focuses on how the term is used in a 
different situation—one which is still metadiscursive (an event about social construction as an 
idea) but in a panel presentation and discussion rather than in a publication. 
The third context is in many ways the most interesting for discourse analysis because it features 
spoken discourse (albeit prepared and sometimes read presentations). This context will be looked 
at in more detail than the previous two: as an example of naturally-occurring interaction, it offers 
a glimpse of the construction of social construction’s current meanings as they unfold in a 
particular moment.  
The video recording analyzed is of the five years out Communication as Social 
Construction panel at the 2009 NCA meeting in Chicago, Illinois. At this panel, five 
communication scholars shared thoughts on social construction before opening the discussion to 
the room: Wendy Leeds-Hurwitz, John Stewart, Mariaelena Bartesaghi (presented by Theresa 
Castor), Saskia Witteborn, and Laura Black. The panel had asked participants to respond to two 
questions (how has social construction contributed to the discipline of communication studies: 
what has been done and where should it go in the future? Should social construction be seen as 
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one approach, or as a foundational concept?) and had described a basic framing of what social 
construction was (the relational or conjoint character of all human meaning-making).  
Each participant took up a slightly different concern with the idea of social construction. 
Stewart, for example, used the concept largely in its original ontological and epistemological 
way to question what reality “is.” Stewart proposed that social construction should underlie all 
studies of human social life. He examined the philosophical and ontological basis of social 
construction, arguing that it represents “the way things are for humans” and claiming that 
everything humans experience is socially constructed, therefore, any study of human experience 
must involve social construction.  
Leeds-Hurwitz focused on its disciplinary implications and the need to expand on the 
resources scholars use to do social construction research. She emphasized particularly on the 
ways in which social constructions often mask their constructedness, becoming normalized and 
reified within particular boundaries of their own making and leaving less room for reflection. 
Witteborn took a similar tack, questioning the cultural basis of social construction as a 
perspective. After defining social construction as “the ways in which social beings come to an 
understanding with and about themselves and the world in and through communication,” she 
argued that the claims often made on behalf of a relational and co-constructed approach to social 
reality as self expression were themselves cultured and ideological.  
Bartesaghi took up the concerns with the consequentiality, materiality and purported 
relativism of taking a social constructionist approach. She recounted her experiences teaching a 
graduate course and the varying emotional and intellectual responses to the idea of oppression as 
a social construct. This highlighted the way in which critical concerns have often sought to 
challenge social construction: “oppression” is sometimes contrasted as a material experience 
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against social construction. Bartesaghi used this example to show how people construct the 
meanings of experiences based on the consequences of interpreting experiences as social 
constructions. Black offered views on how social construction has been put into practice in the 
context of public deliberation and dialogue and how practitioners have brought people with 
differing worldviews together to socially construct new understandings in the face of conflict. 
This addressed the potentially usefulness of social construction as an ordinary practice and not 
just a metatheoretical approach. 
The panel participants tackled numerous ways of using and talking about social 
construction in their presented material. These views on social construction can be associated 
with different assumptions. Some for instance were more critical and others more practical. 
These assumptions point to some of the aspects of social construction which are not routinely 
explicated, as demonstrated by how they were responded to in the follow-up questions at the end 
of the panel. The question-and-answer session, which comprised the last 14 minutes of the panel, 
included questions from the audience (each of which were responded to by most panel 
members). The analysis below looks at three moments during this period to look into ways in 
which social constructionist concepts are constructed in ongoing talk. 
In response to the first question Castor discusses multivocality and addresses the concern 
of relativism. She states that she is “not wanting all constructions to be validated” and offers 
Bartesaghi’s example of talking out implications as a way to judge constructions on the basis of 
their consequences: “in recognizing there are different voices we don’t just have to leave them in 
isolation but instead um (0.8) think relationally they worked it out and talked it out well what are 
the practical consequences of seeing things a particular way.” In this response Castor addresses a 
critical challenge to social construction as well as a practical perspective.  
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This response also makes a connection between relationality and social construction, but 
in a different way than Witteborn’s criticism. In Witteborn’s earlier comments, relationality was 
associated with the idea of personal expression and identified as a Western-centered ideal. Here, 
relationality is more associated with a Bakhtinian (1981) sense of the interplay of ideologies. 
This again highlights how even within one association commonly made with social 
construction—that it is relational—there can be multiple meanings.  
In Castor’s response, the use of “social construction” did not need to be used explicitly 
(since the panel is about it)—but the term is a good one for capturing the sorts of things she is 
talking about. In this example, Castor draws on various ideas related to social construction, but 
all are recognizable in ways that open them up for potential further inquiry. Someone could have 
asked for instance, “how this concept of relationality different from what Witteborn was talking 
about?” or “would critical scholars see anything wrong with taking this practical approach to 
address the need for making judgments?”  
In the next two examples, however, there are fewer opportunities to pursue social 
constructionist ideas. The following excerpt occurs when an audience member asks a question 
about how the idea of “choosing” ontological commitments exaggerates the role of personal or 
individual agency: 
Excerpt 1 
[Q= question asker, A= audience member, L-H= Leeds-Hurwitz] 
Q: Is there any sense that we should need to talk to our students about how 1 
these things also choose us 2 
(0.5) 3 
A1: ((soft laughter)) 4 
A2: that’s an (embarrassing) question 5 
(7.0) ((panel members look around at each other)) 6 
Stewart: sure= 7 
Black: =yeah [(1.0) YEAH] 8 
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[((laughter))] 9 
L-H: I think you’re getting a resounding yes 10 
Black:  yeah (.) how do you do that 11 
((laughter))12 
 
In this exchange, the questioner in the audience draws attention to the concept of agency. 
Though implicated in the concept of construction, this concept is not one which has often been 
explicitly discussed in communication research. Though it would doubtless be acknowledged by 
most that participants are both creative and constrained in doing constructions, the critical 
approach is marked by a tendency to notice constraints. Q’s remark thus seems to be inviting a 
discussion which would consider the more critical conception of social construction.  
The panel’s response to the remark shows little initial uptake. The participants align quite 
strongly with what was said (lines 7, 8, 10, 11) but display some hesitation to discuss it further 
(the long delay of response in line 6, the teasing return of the question on line 11). This does not 
mean the topic was not going to be elaborated. In fact, conference panels seem to routinely do 
this sort of thing with certain kinds of questions: looking around for who wants to answer, 
perhaps erupting in a little chorus of agreement or disagreement or negotiations amongst 
themselves about who is going to speak, before someone is ratified to officially take the turn. 
Sometimes this will be followed by several or even all members taking subsequent turns. It is 
one way of showing that a question has been marked, perhaps as “difficult” (this possibility 
seems borne out by the audience member’s comment at line 5, which was delivered quietly but 
overheard by the camera). It is possible that the panel might have responded eventually, but 
another member of the audience interjects during the laughter on line 12: 
Excerpt 2 
Q: Two ontological (choices) either reality exists (.) outside of us and can be 1 
measured or it’s socially constructed and I think that phrase that you used? 2 
Epistemic humility?= 3 
A Discourse Analysis of Social Construction 2 
 
LH?: =m hm= 4 
A?: =hm: 5 
Q: Is lacking sometimes on one side that- at least that was my impression of it 6 
and that made the conversations with ( ) because I feel like (1.0) on the 7 
critical side (.)  that makes total sense and on the other side it doesn’t 8 
make sense (to them) so: and what you were saying yeah there’s 9 
absolutely ( ) 10 
Black:  I guess in defense of social science 11 
 
In this final excerpt, the question of ontology returns and is linked explicitly to reality. Here 
again the critical approach is relevant, by mention rather than by inference, and contrasted with 
social science where “social science” seems to refer to traditional post-positivist social scientists. 
The question-asker’s comments propose a difference between critical scholars (“the critical side” 
line 7) and social scientists (“the other side” line 8) regarding an earlier term used (“epistemic 
humility” line 3). This term is associated with the social constructionist approach, which does not 
assume that one epistemology is better or more accurate than another. Black’s beginning turn in 
line 10 (not shown here in full) goes on to explain that social scientists treat their work and their 
subjects of study as a process and in similar ways to how constructionists would see things.  
 In these two prior excerpts, there seems to be a tension between the way people refer to 
social constructionist concepts in relation to commonly-delineated metatheoretical boundaries in 
communication research (critical, positivist social scientists, constructionist social scientists). In 
excerpt 1, constructionists are in a sense called to account for a concept relevant to critical 
research: agency. This concept is related to the meaning of social construction: As mentioned 
earlier in the paper, one critical way of looking at social construction sees it as contrasting with 
or obscuring material “realities” such as oppression. Investing ontological choices with agency—
in the same way speaking about social construction can perhaps over-emphasize the creative 
control of participants—is at odds with some critical strands of research.  
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 In excerpt 2, the questioner separates critical scholars from social scientists, but refers to 
social scientists to mean positivistic social scientists. This seems to align the panel members with 
a critical perspective (where social construction and epistemic humility “makes total sense,” line 
8); however, several (if not most) of the panel members would not name themselves as critical 
scholars. Furthermore, the division between two ontological choices (“either reality exists 
outside of us and can be measured or it’s socially constructed,” lines 1-2) is probably not one 
with which all of the panelists would agree. Social construction “all the way down” has not been 
a major source of argument since the earlier, more radical-seeming days of social construction 
(as mentioned in the literature review), probably because it does not need to be (since most 
communication scholars are dealing with social phenomena anyway). However, a critical 
approach can reignite the ontological reality question because some critical scholars see social 
constructions as illusory (perhaps part of the legacy of Marxist false consciousness). 
What seems to be going on is that the audience is made up of differently-identified 
groups of people: critical and social construction scholars mainly. In the two excerpts discussed 
above, social constructionist concepts were linked to different assumptions and different ways of 
categorizing intellectual commitments. The terms associated with “social construction” are part 
of a metadiscursive vocabulary most likely to be used explicitly when the concept is being 
discussed: terms such as agency, social science, ontological. But these terms are largely used 
unproblematically, as if everyone will share the same interpretations of them. A feature of 
multifunctional terms like “social construction” and its accompanying terms is that it is usefully 
interpretable. Unfortunately, not all interpretations are explained or made explicit, even in 
situations where their use is visible and under interrogation.       
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 This section presented examples of how the term “social construction” during 
metadiscursive events about social construction. The section highlighted differences in uses of 
the term in two state-of-the-art publications before moving to an example of spoken discussions 
in the context of a conference panel about social construction. Following a brief summary of how 
social construction was used differently in each panel presentation, I analyzed talk during the 
question-and-answer phase of the panel to see what other uses of the term might emerge. The 
next section summarizes the project and its conclusions, discusses implications for practice, 
considers limitations, and offers directions for future research. 
Discussion and Implications 
As Leeds-Hurwitz (2009b) has noted, “social construction” is often invoked as a research 
perspective without the use of the particular phrase. Especially from the late 1980s onward, 
phrases such as “interpretive,” “social,” and “constitutive” have been terms which cue a social 
constructionist approach (Bartesaghi & Castor, 2008). The use of “construction” as well as 
“joint” and “coordination” are others which emphasize the creative relationship between 
communication and social reality as well as its emergence through the actions of multiple 
participants. And yet the phrase “social construction” is employed as a regular practice in 
communication scholarship.  
 This paper reviewed some trends in where and how often “social construction” has been 
used in some communication journals before looking more closely at specific uses within 
published articles. This was followed by a look at two state-of-the-art publications about social 
construction, and a convention panel on the theme. Across these cases, social construction was 
referred to in different ways. Although many of its uses and meanings cohered around similar 
themes, differences and contradictions arose. Variations in how “social construction” was used 
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included using it as a perspective (metatheoretical, ontological), as the process of creating 
meaningful concepts, as a joint activity, as a way of categorizing intellectual commitments; as 
well as to refer to relationality, historicity, means of construction, the relationship between 
construction and the material world, practical applications, and possible consequences. These 
meanings are certainly related as well as valuable. What makes their multiplicity potentially 
problematic is that (1) each of these ideas can also be defined in multiple ways; and (2) they are 
rarely specified when people are using “social construction” or talking about it. It’s not 
reasonable to assume people will define everything they say as they say it—not having to is one 
of the luxuries indicated by a term’s having become familiar if not accepted—and as mentioned 
earlier in the paper, having ideas open to multiple interpretations can be worthwhile, part of what 
makes certain terms persuasive.  
On the other hand, this can cause potential interactional troubles. In the sense defined by 
Tracy and colleagues (e.g., Agne & Tracy, 2001; Tracy, 1997; Tracy & Muller, 2001), 
interactional troubles arise from problems or dilemmas in interactional choices, such as what to 
say and how to say it.  One trouble with the multiplicity of social construction meanings is that 
people may not realize they are talking about different things. This will result in such common 
experiences as people “talking past each other.” Though a variety of resources exist for dealing 
with such phenomena (repair, for instance) after the fact, such resources are necessarily delayed 
(and one cannot help but think, inefficient) in publication processes, and were not employed in 
the example of naturally-occurring interaction analyzed previously.  
Another trouble is that the different meanings implicated by a single concept may 
sometimes contradict. This is highlighted by the ontological distinctions assumed to characterize 
post-positivist social scientists, critical scholars, and social constructionists. Post-positivist social 
24 
 
scientists are assumed to not align with constructionism—yet as Black pointed out in the 
conference panel, they may follow similar ideas. On the other hand, while many critical scholars 
and constructionist social scientists may use “social construction,” they use the term in different 
ways with different emphases. One difference is that critical scholars sometimes see social 
construction as illusions and focus more on their “invented” nature (often invented by elite 
societal members) of constructions. This is different from seeing all social life as constructed, 
and more different still from seeing everything in general as constructed.  
Even in the quotation by Leeds-Hurwitz at this paper’s opening there are markers of 
contradictions which can emerge talking about social construction. Twice she refers to 
disciplines as “made up,” once calls them “invented,” and then states that we think (wrongly, it is 
implied) that they “actually exist in some fashion.” By no means am I about to suggest that 
Leeds-Hurwitz is secretly harboring realist tendencies of the sort which would thence deem 
disciplines unreal, unimportant or illusory. Rather, Leeds-Hurwitz’s language in describing 
social construction points to how goals in communication shape forms of talk and are 
consequential for what is being talked about. Indeed, the quotation is representative of the 
analysis of the prior section and suggests a possible reason for how the differing ideas about 
social construction in communication scholarship have come to be.  
 “Social construction” has been persuasive in part because it challenges assumptions. As 
with scientific thought experiments which often sound bizarre and feature extreme (even 
impossible) hypothetical scenarios (e.g., Schrodinger’s Cat, Maxwell’s Demon), social 
construction pushed one to rethink what was natural and ordinary and why it seemed so. And by 
putting communication at the center of (and as an answer to) what constitutes the very fabric of 
human society, communication scholars could better explain what they were doing, why, and 
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how it was different from what had come before. Thus, using “social construction” and drawing 
on some of its implications about reality is a way of making people rethink how they know what 
reality is. But of course a potential unintended consequence of this persuasive aim is that it can 
be misinterpreted.  
As the Thomas Theorem puts it, “If men [sic] define situations as real, they are real in 
their consequences” (attributed to W. I Thomas in Merton, 1968). The realist ontology matters 
less to social construction if it is enfolded within a practical metatheoretical perspective, as 
articulated in several examples in this paper; on the other hand, it is very much alive in several 
areas of critical scholarship. This indicates that there will be problems with the use and 
interpretations of “social construction” among social constructionists and critical scholars, both 
of whom use and “believe in” the concept while potentially meaning different things by it.  
Reformulations of the Thomas Theorem provide other clues as to how different 
communication scholars explicitly use (or do not use) social construction based on this 
ontological distinction. For example, in an article by Mehan (1990) which begins by quoting 
Thomas, the theorem is rephrased: “all people define situations as real; but when the powerful 
people define situations as real, then they are real for everybody involved in their consequences 
(p. 173)” [italics in original].     
Meanwhile, in the introduction to Frame Analysis, Goffman (1974) presents the Thomas 
Theorem as a less interesting question than one posed by William James: under what 
circumstances do we think things are real? This is of course an empirical question, and perhaps a 
similar impetus has resulted in empirical studies and areas such as LSI seeing less need to deal 
with the metatheoretical and theoretical concerns connected to using “social construction.” This 
seems reasonable, and is implicated by the way in which social construction already appears in 
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publications. The usefulness of “social construction” is more apparent in metatheoretical and 
theoretical discussions as well as, and particularly in, metadiscursive events about the status of 
social construction.  
As long as social construction continues to inform communication scholarship—and it 
seems in no danger of stopping, regardless of how often it is named—then returning to its 
assumptions seems a valuable exercise. It provides vocabularies and ways of talking about 
intellectual commitments and assumptions so that such issues can be questioned, analyzed, and 
developed. It is important that in using the term, particularly in the context of re-interrogating it, 
being explicit and elaborative about what is meant and how concepts are used will be more 
helpful in some cases than leaving things open to interpretation or assuming everyone will define 
and use all vocabulary in the same way. This is part of what needs to be done if we assume we 
do want to construct the discipline to be one which is reflective about that constructive process. 
This paper has presented the results of various kinds of analysis across several contexts. 
As such, there was a lot of ground covered, but not comprehensively; and there was only so 
much depth to reach in the analyses. It is hoped that what has been presented herein has provided 
sufficient data, analyses, conclusions and implications to be worth discussing and potentially 
exploring. It is both a commentary on what has come before, and a starting point for what ideals 
should be maintained moving toward the future. Metadiscourse about valued concepts are part of 
what constitutes what matters and what means in academic communities. “Social construction” 
is certainly a term which fulfills that function, and deserves as much reflexivity as it should 
engender.  
Whenever disagreements over words arise, different strategies emerge as ways to settle or 
manage the disagreement. This paper does not, for instance, argue for going back to an original 
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source (such as Berger and Luckmann, 1966) to capture some definitive or most-true use of 
social construction. Rather, this paper examined what about how the term has actually been used 
makes certain meanings and utilizations of it more or less practical for communication research. 
It seems “social construction” is undergoing a shift similar to that undergone in other important 
terms—rhetoric for instance, or even “communication.” The term is in some sense in danger of 
becoming useless and meaningless precisely because it has become so useful and meaningful.  
Concluding Remarks 
 Social construction has been an increasingly visible communication approach. From the 
NCA 2006 summer institute and Galanes and Leeds-Hurwitz’s 2009 volume, to the creation of 
NCA’s Communication as Social Construction division and Bartesaghi and Castor’s 2008 article, 
social construction is an active perspective and topic in the communication field. There are many 
ways of doing social construction research, many questions with which it contends, and many 
ways of talking about it. The use of the phrase “social construction” is itself a practice which 
indexes particular meanings and associations which have evolved to accommodate a variety of 
meanings and functions. As social construction research continues to flourish, the interrogations 
of what it means and what it should mean must retain their visibility as social constructions, in 
part, by remembering how they have been and continue to be constructed. 
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1 This time constraint occurred because either (1) the phrase did not appear before 1987 or (2) the journal was not 
searchable back that far online (some newer journals do not go back as far as 1987). 
